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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : Case No. 20050257-SC 
JAMES L. ROBISON, : 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The Court of Appeals reversed a felony conviction based upon a plea of 'guilty' 
for two reasons set forth in their opinion. The first was that the taking of the guilty plea 
by the defendant/respondent did not comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure in that there was no clear understanding as to the elements of the offense to 
which the plea was taken; which was ISSUING A BAD CHECK. The second reason was 
because the court determined that, based upon the record, that the charges against the 
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defendant did not have a factual basis for the reason the check he had given for payment 
of a truck was issued over ten (10) days after the truck was delivered and, since there was 
no contemporaneous exchange of the check for the truck, there was no criminal violation 
of the bad check law. The State contends the appellate court is in error for even 
considering the bad check law requirements and that there reasoning requiring 
contemporaneous exchange is flawed. 
STANDARD OF REVD2W 
The Court of Appeals had discretion to decide the issue based on the necessity to 
enter a proper decision. See Kaiserman Assoc, Inc. v. Francis Town. 977 P.2d 462, 
(Utah 1998). The issue presented to this court is the appellate court's abuse of discretion 
What is the time frame considered by the Utah bad check law which makes it a 
crime for a person to issue or pass a check for the purpose of obtaining property. This 
issue concerns a question of statutory interpretation that this court reviews for 
correctness. See State v. Lusk. 37 P.3d 1103 (2001 Utah 102). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal requires interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505 and 
application of Section 7, Article 1, the Constitution of Utah (due process of law) (West 
2004) and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; attached as Addendum A, B 
andC. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the time of this incident, the defendant was a state-licensed car dealer, fully 
bonded, and in such capacity had a customer who was interested in purchasing a certain 
popular GMC three-quarter ton pickup truck (R. 396:8). He contacted other dealers, 
including Painter Motor Company, another state-licensed car dealer, and its representative 
Randy Painter inquiring if they had the truck his customer was interested in available to 
them, and if he could acquire such a truck. (R. 396:5-6) 
Painter Motor, through its agents, agreed to conduct a search and soon found the 
described truck. They then acquired the truck and brought it to their place of business in 
Nephi, Juab County Utah. On or about September 1, 2001, Randy Painter, Painter Motor 
Company agent, contacted the defendant and advised him that the truck he had inquired 
about was available at their business in Nephi. He agreed to allow the defendant to come 
to their place of business in Nephi and examine the truck. This the defendant did. 
After examining the truck, the defendant indicated that he had initial interest in the 
truck and requested Painter to allow him to obtain and take possession of the truck and 
transport it to his customer in Utah County where his customer could examine the truck 
and determine if he was interested. His commitment at that time was that, after he had 
consulted with his customer, he would then contact Randy Painter to advise him of his 
customer's decision. (R. 396:8) 
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The defendant then transported the truck from Juab County to Utah County where 
it was shown to the customer. The customer was interested in the truck and they agreed 
upon a purchase price. At that point, the defendant then called Randy Painter and advised 
him that the customer wanted to keep the truck. (R. 396:10) Painter agreed. The truck 
was never returned to Painter, but remained with the customer. 
The defendant and Randy Painter then agreed that there would be a certain 
exchange of documents. The defendant and Randy Painter each understood that, since 
the defendant was a licensed and bonded Utah car dealer, he had authority to complete a 
sale to his customer and to complete the appropriate initiation of a title by the Utah State 
Department of Motor Vehicles. (R. 396:13). 
The defendant had delivered possession of the truck to his customer and the 
customer paid for the truck and continued to maintain possession. The trial court has 
ruled that, at that point, the customer became the owner of the truck as a good-faith 
purchaser in the due course of business. (R. 50, 101, 183) 
Subsequently, the defendant had some conversation with Randy Painter regarding 
title to the truck and payment. Eventually, approximately two weeks after taking 
possession of the truck, the defendant delivered to Painter Motor Company the check 
upon which this action is based. The check was dishonored. 
There were further conversations between the defendant and Painter Motor 
Company and a second check was subsequently issued to Painter Motor Company. The 
4 
second check was also dishonored. Subsequently these criminal proceeding were 
prosecuted. 
One of the first issues addressed in the criminal proceedings was the ownership 
and possession of the subject vehicle. (R. 16) The purchaser was represented by attorney 
Robert J. Schumacher. Hearings were held and the court entered its ruling determining 
that the owner of the vehicle was a good-faith purchaser, having paid for the vehicle and, 
under Utah law, was the owner of the vehicle and, consequently, the attempts of the State 
to prevent the purchaser from maintaining possession and securing a Utah state vehicle 
title were quashed and denied. (R. 183) 
Over the next year, several hearings were held in this matter, including preliminary 
hearing and the hearing on the question of the purchaser and possessor's ownership of the 
truck and there were negotiations regarding a resolution of this case. Those negotiations 
concluded by the parties agreeing that the defendant would withdraw his plea of 'not 
guilty', the State would dismiss some charges, and the defendant would enter a plea of 
'no contest' to Count I - the Bad Check charge which is now before the court. The 
defendant's attorney prepared a written statement in advance of the entry of the 'no 
contest' plea and spent over two hours reviewing that statement with the defendant. (R. 
398:1-6) The following day, the defendant and his attorney then appeared before the 
District Court for entry of plea. 
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At the plea hearing, counsel for the defendant explained to the court what the 
parties contemplated, the entry of a plea of 'no contest' to Count I and indicated that a 
plea statement had been prepared, which the defendant had initialed and was prepared to 
proceed with. At this point, the prosecutor indicated that he had changed his mind; that 
he would not accept a plea of 'no contest' but that he required a straight-up guilty plea (R. 
398; 3-4). 
The court, counsel for the parties, and the defendant then engaged in negotiations 
in an attempt to resolve a difficult case by trying to conclude the plea agreement. That 
difficulty is exhibited in part by the record on the conversation between the court, 
counsel, and the defendant which is more fully set forth below: (R. 398:3-20) 
Page 3, line 7 G. WEIGHT: 
Page 3, line 16 D. LEAVITT: 
Page 4, line 8 D. LEAVITT: 
Page 4, line 14 G. WEIGHT: 
I have prepared a statement of defendant 
in support of a no contest plea to issuing 
a bad check. 
We said that in exchange for the no 
contest it would be theft by deception. 
Well, he can take his pick. He can have 
guilty to the bad check or no contest to a 
theft by deception. 
Well, I guess we don't have a deal, Your 
Honor. 
Page 5, line 1 J. ROBISON: Well, there was no intention to . . . no 
intention to a, steal this truck. 
Page 6, line 22 J. ROBISION: 
Page 7, line 15 G. WEIGHT: 
Page 9, line 1 JUDGE EYRE: 
. . . check in existing on an existing debt 
and not of obtaining . . . . 
Well, I don't think we have a deal. 
Do you have questions? 
Page 9, line 5 J. ROBISON: 
Page 20, line 11 D. LEAVITT: 
I do. 
Factual basis, this defendant. . . issued a 
check or draft a, in exchange for 
something of value at a time when the 
account upon which it was written was 
closed. 
Page 20, line 16 J. ROBISON: That is not a correct statement, Your 
Honor. 
Quoting direct from Page 21, emphasis added: 
JUDGE EYRE: Okay. You, you did issue a check which 
was not honored by your bank. Is that 
correct? 
J. ROBISON: That's correct. 
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JUDGE EYRE: 
J. ROBISON: 
JUDGE EYRE: 
And a, upon notice of it not being 
honored did you, did you at any time 
make that check good? 
I attempted to, Your Honor, and my 
bonding company also attempted to, but 
we were not able to completely do it. 
Okay. And, a. in exchange for that a car 
was delivered. Is that correct? A 
vehicle was -
J. ROBISON: No. The car was delivered several 
weeks prior to that. 
JUDGE EYRE: 
J. ROBISON: 
JUDGE EYRE: 
J. ROBISON: 
JUDGE EYRE: 
Well, I mean 
There was a vehicle in, a transaction did 
involve a vehicle. 
Yes. Okay. And that vehicle had a 
value in excess of $5,000? 
It did, Your Honor. 
The Court finds there's a factual basis 
accepts your guilty plea, finds it was 
voluntarily and knowingly given with a 
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full understanding of your constitutional 
rights. 
The defendant then entered his guilty plea to the bad check charge. 
Defense counsel was allowed to withdraw. However, the defendant, acting pro se, 
filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which was denied by the trial court, and he appealed 
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has ruled that the defendant's plea was not 
voluntarily entered in accordance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
has further ruled that the factual statement made by the defendant, as set forth in the 
above colloquy, sets forth a full defense to the crime charged and thus reversed the trial 
court in its Memorandum Decision. The State does not oppose the appellate court's 
ruling that there was no compliance with Rule 11 and that, based on such a ruling, the 
judgment of the District Court should be vacated, and the defendant allowed to withdraw 
his guilty plea, but does contend against the ruling of the appellate court determining that 
there was no crime committed in that possession of the vehicle involved was not obtained 
by a contemporaneous exchange with the subject check. 
ARGUMENT 
I -- APPELLATE COURTS HAVE THE DUTY TO REVERSE TRIAL 
COURT RULINGS AND JUDGMENTS WHEN THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL EXHIBITS JUDICIAL RULINGS DISCLOSING GREAT AND 
MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
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The record clearly revealed to the appellate court that trial court had not followed 
the requirements of the law in taking the plea of 'guilty' from the defendant. The record 
of the conversation between the trial judge and the defendant regarding the elements of 
the offense is clear that the defendant did not admit to the crime charged, nor did he 
accept the statement of the crime as given to him by the judge. Thus there was a clear 
basis for reversing the judgment of the trial court with regard to a withdraw of the plea of 
guilty, but there was also, coupled with that situation, the manifest injustice of the court 
applying pressure on the defendant to plead guilty to something he did not do. Further, 
that the crime charged had not really occurred. When so confronted, the court has a duty 
to act, and the appellate court has so acted. The court has a duty to exercise its discretion 
and make determinations "necessary to a proper decision" Kaiserman Assoc. Inc. v . 
Francis Town, supra. 
Under certain circumstances, the facts of a case may demonstrate and that great 
and manifest injustice would be done if the court does not entertain the issue sue sponte 
as an exception to the preservation rule. See State v. Pierce. 655 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982). 
It should be noted from the facts in the case of State v. Pierce that Pierce attempted to 
obtain some advantage by a demonstration before the jury of her placing her foot in a 
shoe. There was no objection to the procedure made at the time. However, on appeal, for 
the first time counsel for Pierce raised that issue as a violation of her constitutional rights. 
Since she had first attempted advantage, there was no showing of great and manifest 
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injustice when the court rejected her argument on appeal. However, the court did note the 
prerogative of the appellate court to consider issues sua sponte if there was a need to 
correct great and manifest injustice. That is exactly the argument which the 
defendant/respondent makes in this case. Also, there is an exception to the opinion in 
State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). In the present case, an objection was made by 
the defendant to Judge Eyre which is clear in the dialogue between the Judge and the 
defendant at the time of taking his plea. That conversation disclosed great and manifest 
injustice which offended the conscience of the appellate court. Thus the general provision 
that a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is barred from asserting 
it on appeal should not apply. See State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991). 
The court also noted in that opinion that there are two well-established exceptions to that 
general rule. They are (1) the trial court committed plain error and (2) there are 
exceptional circumstances. 
The error of the trial court in this case is plain and comes from the trial court's 
own language. Judge Eyre said, "Okay. And, a, in exchange for that a car was 
delivered." That is the principle and requirement of the provisions of the bad check law 
found in § 76-6-505. However, defendant disagreed with Judge Eyre, stating "No. The 
car was delivered several weeks prior to that." Additional conversations occurred, but the 
issue of this offense element continued and was never cleared. (R. 398:21) That error is 
plain and the error was clearly evident to the appellate court. That error affected the 
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substantial rights of the defendant in two ways; first as to his rights to fully understand the 
elements of the crime to which he was entering the guilty plea and, two, that he not be 
required to plead guilty to a crime that was not committed. 
The court in Archambeau, supra, also noted that the second exception to the rule 
allowing consideration of issues for the first time on appeal is a catch-all device based 
upon exceptional or unusual circumstances. This case presents exceptional 
circumstances. They are unusual. Considering the number of guilty pleas that are 
accepted by judges in the state of Utah, we find the entry of one such plea in clear 
violation of Rule 11 is exceptional and unusual and constitutes great and manifest 
injustice which allows the court to consider this matter. 
The appellate court's ruling was made by split decision, but it is clear that the 
dissent did not squarely address the facts of the case with regard to the exchange of the 
check for the vehicle and failed to recognize that, at the time that the check was delivered, 
the vehicle belonged to someone else not a party to the original transaction. It belonged 
to a party other than Painter Motor Company and the defendant and it had belonged to 
that other party for over two weeks prior to the check being delivered to Painter Motor. 
In this case, the trial court's recitation of the elements of the offense and the defendant's 
response were clearly called to the court's attention by the defendant's statement that the 
vehicle was not obtained in exchange for his check and there was no resolution of that 
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issue by the Court. This should have been obvious to the trial court and thus complies 
with the plain rule doctrine as set forth in State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). 
It is the court's duty to decide issues necessary to a proper decision, Kaiserman, 
supra. The issue of the application and interpretation of the bad check law was plainly 
and clearly before the appellate court. It leapt from the pages. It required action and the 
appellate court so acted. Clearly the appellate court had the authority to issue its 
determination. The next question raised is that determination reasonably supported by the 
record in this case? The ruling of the appellate court does not involve it in advocating for 
either party, but does involve the appellate court in advocating in support of state law and 
thus the plain error doctrine applies, as well as the correction of manifest injustice and the 
goal of addressing issues necessary to a proper decision. See Bailey v. Bayles. 2001 UT 
App34, 18P.3dll2. 
The State complains that the issue of "contemporaneous exchange" as applied to 
the bad check law had never been previously raised. However, it was raised specifically 
by the trial judge and by the defendant in their dialogue. Furthermore, this question had 
to be raised because of the duplicitous conduct of the County Attorney in changing the 
plea agreement at the last minute, while the parties were present before the court, 
knowing that a substantial amount of effort had been expended in completing and 
explaining the written plea statement which contemplated a 'no contest' plea and not a 
'guilty' plea. The guilty plea requires admission to the elements of the offense. A 'no 
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contest' plea does not require an admission to those elements, only an admission that the 
state has proof to establish the elements. Thus, there is no equity which flows to the state 
in this case requiring further notice of the Rule 11 violation and the time and intent 
language of the bad check law by the use of "purpose of obtaining..." The State thus 
had full notice and opportunity to examine the bad check statute. The defendant's 
contention after the plea was taken, as set forth in his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea (R. 252), was that, because of his pressure for the immediate circumstances in having 
his plea agreement altered in open court when he was appearing before the Judge, did not 
allow him adequate time to consider what was being done and that the trial judge 
essentially forced the entry of the plea without the appropriate compliance with Rule 11. 
His only request was that he be allowed to withdraw that plea so that the issues of the 
innocence or guilt regarding the charge could be appropriately addressed. The defendant 
does not wish to deny the state any rights whatever with regard to presenting the issue of 
the interpretation of the bad check law. However, on the other hand, he should not have 
been denied his rights as clearly set forth in Rule 11- by the pressure to force him to 
admit to a contemporaneous exchange. 
In fairness to the appellate court, it should be acknowledged that the record 
revealed plain error which offends the conscience and constitutes obvious manifest 
injustice which the court was obligated to correct in support of Utah's constitutional 
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provision providing for due process of law set forth in Article 1, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah. Consequently, their decision should be affirmed. 
A plain, clear reading of the Utah bad check statute involves the obvious meaning 
of the words "the check was issued for the purpose of obtaining". What was to be 
obtained in this case? The pickup truck. If you want to obtain something, it means that 
you do not have it. In this case, the facts reveal that, at the time the check was delivered, 
the defendant did not have the truck, nor did Painter Motor Company. Who had the 
truck? The good-faith purchaser. What was the check issued for then? To pay an 
existing debt between Painter Motor and the defendant. Nothing can be plainer. It is that 
plain, obvious interpretation which motivated the Court of Appeals in issuing their 
decision. 
II - A SUBSTANTIALLY CONTEMPORANEOUS EXCHANGE IS A 
DISPOSITIVE ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF ISSUING A BAD 
CHECK 
The provisions of Utah's bad check law, as set forth in § 76-6-505, U.C.A. 
annotated 1953 as amended, provide: "(1) any person who issues or passes a check . . . . 
for the purpose of obtaining, from any person any . . . . property . . . . knowing it will 
not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee is guilty of issuing a bad 
check 
Clearly the statute raises the question of the motive for the issuing of the check and 
the motive must be to commit fraud by using the check as a tool or as an inducement to 
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convince another person to transfer property. Again, the emphasis is again"for the 
purpose of obtaining." 
Counsel for the State has fully briefed the issue of guidelines for interpreting the 
statutes and those cases are adopted by the respondent and thus this court is required, on 
this issue, to consider the question of the plain interpretation of the statute. 
The respondent represents that a plain interpretation requires that the check be 
issued "for the purpose of obtaining" and that the clear meaning of "for the purpose of 
obtaining" means that the item, in this case the truck, not possessed by the person issuing 
the check, but is still in the possession of the person to receive the check. The check is 
the inducement. 
The facts of this case disclose that, at the time the check was issued, the truck was 
already in the hands of a good-faith purchaser. Its possession had been obtained by the 
verbal agreement of the defendant with Painter Motor. It was not in the hands, nor 
possessed by the person who received the check. The person who received the check had 
already delivered the truck. Thus, at the time the truck was delivered, the relationship 
between the defendant and Painter Motor was one of a debtor; the defendant owing a debt 
to his creditor, Painter Motor Company, who thus had an open account with the defendant 
for the value of the truck. At the time the check was issued, there was no exchange. 
The allegations of the petitioner that the respondent has admitted to issuing the 
check for the purpose of obtaining property are based upon the flawed arraignment, and 
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are in conflict with the facts in that the defendant has clearly, as set forth in the 
conversation between he and the Judge on the date of the entry of the plea. That 
conversation revealed that the check was issued for a pre-existing debt and not for the 
purpose of obtaining the truck. Further, as the defendant filed his motions to withdraw 
his plea, he clearly declared that his appearances before the court, because of the existing 
circumstances, were such that he did not clearly understand what was being undertaken. 
He was under disclosed pressure and coercion. (R. 398:19) 
The bad check statute, in wording, does not say a "substantially contemporaneous" 
exchange. However the wording of the statute clearly requires that the check be issued 
"for the purpose of obtaining property" which reasonably supposes that the transactions 
happen within a reasonable, contemporaneous time period and the check must be the 
inducement to the transfer. With regard to a motor vehicle, which is easily moveable and 
moved, that time period is a short one as demonstrated by the facts of this case wherein, 
at the time of the delivery of the check, the vehicle had again been transferred and was in 
the possession of the lawful owner not a party to this action. 
Painter's title had no value at the point of receipt of the check; the truck being in 
the possession of a lawful owner having acquired the same from the Utah-licensed 
automobile dealer. Further, there is no showing in the record that Painter Motor had title 
to the vehicle on the date that the check was received, or for that matter on the date the 
defendant took possession. 
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With the exception of this case, Utah appellate courts have not ruled by using the 
words "contemporaneous exchange," but courts in other states have considered the issue. 
In the case of State v. McLean, 44 So.2d 688 (Louisiana 1950), the court ruled in a case 
where a check was issued for payment of bananas delivered three days prior to the 
issuance of the check: 
"If the check is given subsequent to the receipt of the thing the 
required exchange does not take place, and no intent to defraud attends the 
check's issuance." 
And the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case of Pollard v. State, 244 So.2d 729 
(Miss. 1971), noted that: 
"So an essential element of the offense under section 2153 is the 
making and delivering of the check to another person for value, and thereby 
obtaining from such other person money, goods, or other property of value. 
(Emphasis added). 
"The one indispensable element of this offense is the receiving of 
value for the check at the very time it is delivered. In other words, the seller 
parts with something of value on the belief that the check is good at that 
particular time.. . ." 
Also the Illinois Appellate Court determined, in a case where a post-dated check 
was given for the purchase of grain, that the purchaser received the grain, but the check, 
deposited four days after receipt, by agreement of the buyer and seller, was not honored. 
In overturing the bad check conviction, the court reasoned as follows: 
"The giving of a worthless check in payment of a pre-existing debt is 
generally held not to be within the ban of the statute, the reasons being that 
the party alleged to have been defrauded did not, on the strength of the 
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check, part with anything of value and further the acceptance of a check 
does not pay a debt." 
In the case of State v. Sinclair. 337 A.2d 703 (Md 1975), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, in reserving the conviction of the defendants for issuing a bad check for 
services provided in the 30 days prior to the issuing of the check, stated: 
"The giving of a worthless check in payment of a pre-existing debt is 
generally held not to be within the ban of the statute, the reasons being that 
the party alleged to have been defrauded did not, on the strength of the 
check, part with anything of value and further the acceptance of a check 
does not pay a debt." 
We believe the above-cited cases fairly illustrate the rulings of a majority of courts 
considering contemporaneous exchange and require a contemporaneous exchange as the 
requirement of bad check law involving the issuance of a check for the purpose of 
obtaining property. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The appellate court's ruling that the defendant's guilty plea was improperly 
accepted by the trial judge being uncontested should again be affirmed for the purpose of 
clarity of the proceedings. 
2. The Court of Appeals had a clear duty to consider the facts of this case, 
including the taking of the plea and statements made at that time, for the purpose of 
determining if, in fact, the defendant had admitted to commission of a crime. He clearly 
did not, for he clearly disputed the required elements of issuing a bad check. Property 
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that has already passed for a substantial period of time (several weeks) prior to the receipt 
of the check demonstrates that the check was not issued for the purpose of obtaining and 
the intervention of a third, independent party acquiring the subject property, i.e. the 
pickup truck, prior to the issuance of the check; all parties knowing that this would occur, 
in the interest of justice requires that the Court of Appeals rule as it did and that this court 
sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of October, 2005. 
sntmstaw 
MILTON T. HARMON' 
Cefunsel for the Defendant/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of October, 2005 I served, by facsimile 
transmission to the Utah Supreme Court Appellate Clerk's Office at (801) 578-3999 and 
that on the 28th day of October, 2005,1 personally served the original and nine copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent to the Appellate Court Clerk's office and also served 
two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent by personal delivery to Mr. Matthew D. 
Bates, Assistant Attorney General, at the address of 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111 and to Jared W. Eldridge, Juab County Attorney, and by mailing to 
James L. Robison. 
20 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. 
II. 
III. 
rv. 
v. VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
rx. X. 
XI. 
XII. 
XIII. 
xrv. 
XV. 
XVI. 
XVII. 
XVIII. 
XIX.. 
XX. 
XXI. 
XXII. 
XXIII. 
XXIV. 
Declaration of Rights 
State Boundaries 
Ordinance 
Elections and Right of Suffrage 
Distribution of Powers 
Legislative Department 
Executive Department 
Judicial Department 
Congressional and Legislative Apportionment 
Education 
Local Governments 
Corporations 
Revenue and Taxation 
Public Debt 
Militia 
Labor 
Water Rights 
Forestry 
Public Buildings and State Institutions 
Public Lands 
Salaries 
Miscellaneous 
Amendment and Revision 
Schedule 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITU-
TION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
Section 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
Sec t ion 1. [ I n h e r e n t a n d i n a l i e n a b l e r igh t s . ] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All po l i t i ca l p o w e r i n h e r e n t i n t h e peop le . ] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
1S96 
Sec. 3 . [U tah i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e Union . ] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Rel ig ious l iberty.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rus t or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. 1999 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus . ] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Righ t t o b e a r a rms . ] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses ba i lable . ] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
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case now pending before the court with undivided loyalty to 
the defendant; 
(c)(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration 
have engaged in the active practice of criminal law in the past 
five years; 
(c)(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys 
being considered; and 
(c)(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determi-
nation that counsel to be appointed will fairly, efficiently and 
effectively provide representation to the defendant. 
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to 
death, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to 
represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding 
tha t counsel is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be 
found proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to 
death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys 
must meet the following requirements: 
(d)(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in 
a t least three felony appeals; and 
(d)(2) at least one attorney must have attended and com-
pleted within the past five years an approved continuing legal 
education course which deals, in substantial part, with the 
trial or appeal of death penalty cases. 
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent 
an indigent petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
202(2)(a), the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to 
represent such petitioner at post-conviction trial and on post-
conviction appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is 
qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-
conviction cases. To be found qualified, the combined experi-
ence of the appointed attorneys must meet the following 
requirements: 
(e)(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
served as counsel in at least three felony or post-conviction 
appeals; 
(e)(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a post-conviction case at 
the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated 
proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation; 
(e)(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
attended and completed or taught within the-past five years 
an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in 
substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death penalty 
cases or with the prosecution or defense of post-conviction 
proceedings in death penalty cases; 
(e)(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
tried to judgment or verdict three civil ju ry or felony cases 
within the past four years or ten cases total; and 
(e)(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attor-
neys must total not less than five years in the active practice 
of law. 
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow 
the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself be 
grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively 
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal. 
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be 
paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title 77. 
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel 
shall be paid pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c). 
R u l e 9. R e p e a l e d . 
R u l e 9.5. C h a r g e d mul t ip l e offenses — To b e filed in 
s ing le c o u r t . 
(l)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, cita-
tions, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may 
include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or munic-
ipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal episode as 
defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a single court tha t 
has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest possi-
ble penalty of all the offenses charged. 
(1Kb) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or infor-
mation may not be separated except by order of the court and 
for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicat-
ing the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction 
over all the offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial entity 
shall prosecute the offenses. 
R u l e 10. A i i a l g i i l u e n t . 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the 
records from the magistrate following a bind-over, the defen-
dant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court. Ar-
raignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist 
of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or 
stat ing to him the substance of the charge and calling on him 
to plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or 
information before he is called upon to plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional 
time in which to plead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time 
may be granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any 
proceeding provided for by statute or these rules prior to 
arraignment shall be specifically and expressly objected to 
before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is waived. 
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own 
recognizance, prior to arraignment and thereafter fails to 
appear for arraignment or trial when required to do so, a 
warrant of arrest may issue and bail may be forfeited. 
R u l e 11 . P l e a s . 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant 
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives 
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to 
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not 
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A 
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty 
by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a 
plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent 
of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case 
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make 
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases 
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for 
a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no 
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or 
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption 
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the 
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prose-
cution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
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(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands th& nature and ele-
ments of the offense to which the plea is entered, tha t upon 
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis 
is sufficient if it establishes tha t the charged crime was 
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, tha t the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial 
risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of 
the minimum sentence, tha t may be imposed for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discus-
sion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been 
reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defen-
dant on the record or, if used, a written s tatement reciting 
these factors after the court has established that the defen-
dant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of 
the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the En-
glish language, it will be sufficient that the s tatement has 
been read or t ranslated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by s tatute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, bu t may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears tha t the prosecuting attorney or any 
other par ty has agreed to request or recommend the accep-
tance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of 
other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally tha t any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions 
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, 
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclo-
sure of the tentat ive agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the t ime for tender of the plea. The judge may then 
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should 
not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall 
advise the defeii(d1uK=*aQd then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or w i thd rawthe plea. 
(i) With approval o F « i e court and the consent of the 
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of 
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the 
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to with-
draw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally 
ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court 
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if 
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
ttule 12. Motions. 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or 
hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. 
It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is 
made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported 
by affidavit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue may be 
raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be 
raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(b)(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indict-
ment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdic-
tion in the court or to charge an offense, which objection shall 
be noticed by the court a t any time during the pendency of the 
proceeding; 
(b)(2) motions to suppress evidence; 
(b)(3) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(b)(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or 
(b)(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before 
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or 
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to 
trial or a t the time set by the court shall constitute waiver 
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from 
such waiver. 
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be 
made of all proceedings a t the hearing on motions, including 
such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally. 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the 
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or informa-
tion, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable 
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or 
information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a s ta tute of limitations. 
Rule 13. Pretrial conference. 
(a) The trial court, in its discretion, may hold a pretrial 
conference, with trial counsel present, to consider such mat-
ters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. The accused 
shall be present unless he waives his right to appear. 
(b) At the conclusion of the conference, a pretrial order shall 
set out the mat ters ruled upon. Any stipulations made shall be 
signed by counsel, approved by the court and filed, and shall 
be binding upon the parties at trial, on appeal, and in 
postconviction proceedings unless set aside or modified by the 
court. 
Rule 14. Subpoena. 
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or 
interpreter before a court, magistrate or grand jury in connec-
tion with a criminal investigation or prosecution may be 
issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed, 
the prosecuting attorney on his or her own initiative or upon 
the direction of the grand jury, or the court in which an 
information or indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court 
in which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the 
defendant, without charge, as many signed subpoenas as the 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee 
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for 
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or 
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails 
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused 
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or 
draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in 
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that 
is less than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or 
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third 
degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or 
exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree felony. 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
James L. Robison appeals the trial court's denial of his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of issuing a bad 
check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003) -1 We reverse. 
Robison generally argues that the trial court erred by 
failing to comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure when it accepted his guilty plea. Specifically, 
Robison asserts that his plea does not constitute an admission of 
all of the elements of the offense of issuing a bad check. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. We do not necessarily disagree with 
the dissent's conclusion that Robison did not adequately present 
this issue either to the trial court or to this court. However, 
to avoid a "great and manifest injustice," we will reach this 
issue sua sponte as an exception to the preservation rule. State 
v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) (stating 
that appellate court can reach an issue sua sponte as an 
exception to the preservation rule if a "great and manifest 
1. Because this statute has not changed since Robison was 
charged and convicted, we cite to the most recent version for 
convenience. 
injustice" would otherwise occur); see also State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 923 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing Pierce and 
noting parenthetically that "court can entertain an exception sua 
sponte if facts reveal 'great and manifest injustice' would 
otherwise occur" (quoting Pierce, 655 P.2d at 677)). We agree 
with Robison that his conviction is based upon a guilty plea that 
does not contain an admission to all the elements of the offense 
of issuing a bad check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. In good 
conscience, we cannot affirm Robison's conviction of a crime 
that, according to the plea colloquy, he did not commit. 
Rule 11 provides, in relevant part, that a trial court may 
not accept a defendant's guilty plea until the court has found 
that the plea is an admission of all the elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), 
(e)(4)(A). One of the required elements of issuing a bad check 
under section 76-6-505 is that the defendant must issue a bad 
check "for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, 
partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other thing 
of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), (2). We conclude that 
this element of section 76-6-505 requires a substantially 
contemporaneous exchange. 
During Robison's plea colloquy, Robison admitted that he 
issued a bad check. However, when the trial court specifically 
asked Robison whether it was correct that the vehicle was 
delivered to him "in exchange for" the bad check, Robison 
replied, "No. The car was delivered several weeks prior "to 
[issuance of the bad check] . "2 We conclude that this statement 
represents a complete defense to the charge of issuing a bad 
check under section 76-6-505, because it establishes that there 
was not a substantially contemporaneous exchange--i.e., because 
Robison received the vehicle several weeks prior to issuing the 
bad check, he did not issue the bad check "for the purpose of 
obtaining" the vehicle. Id. The check was irrelevant to the 
transaction involving the sale of the vehicle and simply amounted 
to payment on an open account. See Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 
P. 2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977) (holding that a bad check issued for 
payment on a past due account for goods already received did not 
constitute an exchange for property because the payee was "not 
induced to give anything of value, nor was it in any way cheated 
or adversely affected by the giving of the check"). 
2. During Robison's plea colloquy, he also characterized his 
issuance of the check as payment "on an existing debt." 
3. The dissent recognizes this principle from Howells, Inc. v. 
Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977), but then proceeds to 
(continued...) 
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Because Robison's guilty plea was not an admission of all 
the elements of the offense of issuing a bad check, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-505, we conclude that the trial court erred by 
accepting his plea and by denying his subsequent motion to 
withdraw his plea. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's 
denial of Robison's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand 
for a trial. 
I CONCUR: 
(JU*&&L >n. Huc^*j) 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting): 
James Robison pleaded guilty to issuing a bad check and 
admitted facts sufficient to establish each element of that 
crime. Robison's appellate arguments to the contrary are 
inadequately briefed, lack any reasoned analysis or citation to 
relevant case law, and shift the burden of research and analysis 
to this court. I would reject them on that basis. See Utah R. 
3. (...continued) 
rely upon cases from other jurisdictions to support the 
proposition that a "short delay" between the receipt of goods and 
the issuance of a check may still satisfy the exchange 
requirement. We are not persuaded by the dissent's reliance upon 
these cases that turn on their unique facts. 
The dissent also relies upon State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 
352 (Utah 1986), in which the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a 
defendant's conviction for issuing a bad check when the defendant 
issued the check one week after receiving stock shares. See id. 
at 352, 355. However, Bartholomew does not specifically address 
the issue of a substantially contemporaneous exchange, but 
instead focuses upon whether a thing of value was received. See 
id. at 354-55. We are equally unpersuaded by the dissent's 
reliance upon Bartholomew, 
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App. P. 24; State v. Sloan. 2003 UT App 170,fl3, 72 P.3d 138. 
Further, I see no injustice to Robison in this matter and must 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
The majority opinion concludes that, as a legal matter, 
Robison did not admit to a factual basis for the crime of issuing 
a bad check because, at his plea hearing, he admitted only to 
writing a check "on an existing debt" and that the truck in 
question had been delivered "several weeks prior to" the issuance 
of the check. Generally speaking, Utah law provides that the 
writing of a check on a past due account for goods already 
received does not constitute an exchange "for the purpose of 
obtaining . . . any money, property, or other thing of value," 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003), because the payee is "not 
induced to give anything of value, nor [is he] in any way cheated 
or adversely affected by the giving of the check." Howells, Inc. 
v. Nelson. 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977). However, in the 
context of Robison's plea hearing, it is clear that Robison1s 
answers provided the trial court with a factual basis upon which 
to accept his guilty plea. 
1. Robison's Factual Admissions at the Plea Hearing 
At his plea hearing, Robison never asserted that he had an 
open account with his victim, nor did he or his counsel ever 
alert the judge to any potential conflict between Robison's 
admitted conduct and the statutory language. To the contrary, 
Robison admitted in writing at the plea hearing that he was aware 
of and understood the "for the purpose of obtaining property" 
element of the bad check charge and that there was a factual 
basis for that element. Robison waived his right to have the 
State prove each element of the offense to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, both in writing and orally on the record. 
Based on these and other admissions and waivers, the trial court 
accepted Robison1s guilty plea. 
The majority opinion relies in part on Robison's assertion 
at the plea hearing that his dheck was issued to pay "oi/an 
existing debt." Robison1s statement to this effect occurred 
outside the formal factual basis colloquy and prior to his 
decision to plead guilty to a crime, his decision of what crime 
to plead to, and his written admission of factual guilt of the 
bad check charge. When Robison made the "existing debt" comment, 
he still had the right to present inconsistent theories or 
defenses.1 The trial court was under no obligation to consider 
1. See State v. Mitcheson. 560 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1977) 
("[The State's burden of proof] gives the defendant the benefit 
(continued...) 
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such inconsistencies once Robison decidfd to plead guilty to the 
bad check charge and proceeded with the formal plea process, 
including submitting his formal factual admissions as required by 
Rule 11. 
At the plea hearing, prior to the trial court's acceptance 
of his plea, Robison signed a statement in support of plea. He 
adopted this statement on the record. The typed statement had 
handwritten corrections to reflect the last-minute change from a 
no contest plea to a guilty plea, although some typed references 
to a no contest plea remained. Corrected to reflect Robison s 
actual plea of guilty, the statement contained the following 
admissions: 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) 
Information against me. I have read it, ° r 
had it read to me, and I understand the 
nature and the elements of crime(s) to which 
I am pleading [guilty] or no contest. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I 
am pleading [guilty] are -. 
Count I: That I, JAMES L. ROBISON, on 
or about September 11, 2001, in Juab 
County, State of Utah, did issue a check 
for the payment of money for the purEg-Se_ 
of obtaining- property knowing that it 
would not be paid by the drawee and 
payment was refused. 
I understand that by pleading guilty, I am ^  
not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes. I stipulate and agree that if I a-m 
pleading guilty, I do not dispute or contest 
that the following facts describe my conduct 
. . . . These facts provide a basis for the 
court to accept my [guilty] plea and prove 
the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading [guilty]: 
On or about September 11, 2001, in Juab 
County, State of Utah, I issued a 
check 
for the payment of money for the purpiSgjjt 
of obtaining property knowing that it 
would not be paid by the drawee and 
payment was refused. 
1. (...continued) 
of every defense thereto which may cause a reasonable doubt to 
exist as to his guilt, arising either from the evidence, or lack 
of evidence, in the case; and this is true whether___his defenses. 
are consistent or not." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
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(Emphases added.) The trial court expressly asked Robison if he 
had any questions about this written statement, and, except for a 
restitution matter, he did not. The court proceeded to question 
Robison about his plea decision and, upon satisfying itself that 
Robison was acting knowingly and voluntarily, accepted his plea 
of guilty. 
After accepting the plea, the trial court conducted the 
following colloquy to establish its factual basis: 
The Judge: Factual basis, Mr. Leavitt? 
[Prosecutor] Mr. Leavitt: Your honor, 
on the date set forth in the Information this 
defendant, James L. Robison, issued a check 
or a draft a, in exchange for something of 
value at a time when the account upon which 
it was written was closed, and the amount 
exceeded $5,000. 
Defendant: That is not a correct 
statement, Your Honor. 
The Judge: What is a correct statement, 
Mr.--
Defendant: Well, I have a letter from 
the . . . . The correct statement is that 
account was not closed, the--
The Judge: Well--
Defendant: --payment was not, was not 
honored by the bank but the account was not 
closed. I have a letter in my file from the 
institution stating that it was open. 
The Judge: Okay. You, you did issue a 
check which was not honored by your bank. Is 
that correct? 
Defendant: That's correct. 
The Judge: And a, upon notice of it not 
being honored did you, did you at any time 
make that check good? 
Defendant: I attempted to, Your Honor, 
and my bonding company also attempted to, but 
we were not able to completely do it. 
The Judge: Okay. And a, in exchange 
fj£\ that a car was delivered. Is that 
ssorrect? A vehicle was--
(^  Defendant: No. The car was delivered 
several weeks prior to that. 
The Judge: Well, I mean--
Defendant: There was a vehicle in, a 
transaction did involve a vehicle. 
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The Judge: Yes. Okay. And that 
vehicle had a value in excess of $5,000? 
Defendant: It did, Your Honor. 
Based on this colloquy, the trial court found that there was a 
factual basis for Robison' s guilty plea. « 
2. Robison1s Admissions Alone Support His PlVc 
There is nothing in Robison's written or oral statements at 
the plea hearing, and certainly nothing in the formal factual 
colloquy, to establish a factual or legal defense to a bad check 
charge. While alleging a short delay between physical delivery 
of the truck and his issuance of the check, Robison failed to 
allege that the victim was not "cheated or adversely affected by 
the giving of the check." Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 5 65 P.2d 
1147, 1149 (Utah 1977). As detailed later in this opinion, the 
record as a whole reflects that the victim had retained legal 
title to the truck and was only induced to provide it to Robison 
upon the issuance of the bad check. Even assuming the trial 
court could not consider this record evidence for purposes of 
accepting Robison's plea, Robison1s failure to deny cheating or 
adversely affecting the victim, his admission of a transaction 
involving the truck, and his factual admission of his "purpose of 
obtaining property" provide more than enough factual basis to 
satisfy Rule ll.2 
Even if the sole factor to be considered was the passage of 
time, there is no precedent establishing that a delay between 
receipt of property and issuance of a check automatically 
precludes a bad check conviction. To the contrary, in State v. 
Bartholomew, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a bad check 
conviction resulting from the issuance of a check one week after 
the receipt of stock shares by the defendant. See 724 P.2d 352, 
352 (Utah 1986). I see no meaningful distinction between the one 
week delay implicitly approved in Bartholomew and the "several 
2. Given Robison's written and oral admissions over the course 
of the plea hearing, I am also inclined to find that Robison is 
estopped from raising the factual basis argument on appeal. The 
elements of equitable estoppel are: "(1) an admission, statement 
or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) 
action by the other party on the faith of such admission, 
statement or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting 
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
admission, statement or act." Department of Human Servs. v. 
Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997). Each of these elements 
is arguably present in this matter. 
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weeks" delay3 asserted by Robison in the fact colloquy. So long 
as there is., as Robison admitted/lkt his plea hearing, but a 
single "transaction," I do not vffe^Jhe delay in this matter as 
falling outside the legislature's intention or the rule set forth 
in Howells. See 565 P.2d at 1149. Any distinction that might be 
drawn certainly fails to give rise to "great and manifest 
injustice" as relied upon by the majority opinion.4 
3. The record reveals an actual delay of ten days between 
Robison taking physical possession of the truck and his writing a 
bad check in payment for it. 
4. State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352 (Utah 1986), did not 
explicitly address the contemporaneous exchange requirement, but 
the failure of the supreme court to identify and address the 
issue suggests that it would not find Robison's situation.to be 
one of manifest injustice. 
Other states addressing this issue have expressly concluded 
that a short delay between the receipt of goods and the issuance 
of a check may still satisfy the exchange requirement: 
Where a worthless check is given as payment 
for goods already received, there is no 
present consideration, and a conviction for 
criminal issuance of a bad check must be 
reversed unless "the interval [between 
delivery of goods or services and payment 
therefor] is slight and the exchange can be 
characterized as a single contemporaneous 
transaction." 
Ledford v. State, 362 S.E.2d 133, 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) 
(emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); 
see also State v. Piatt, 845 P.2d 815, 817 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that "a worthless check is given for something of value 
if the worthless check is issued as part of a contemporaneous 
transaction between the parties in which something of value is 
exchanged for the check, without regard to whether the thing of 
value is delivered before or after the worthless check is 
issued"). Ledford addressed a payment by check one day after the 
receipt of goods, see 362 S.E.2d at 133-34, while in Piatt the 
defendant issued a bad check fourteen days after the receipt of 
goods and services. See 845 P.2d at 816. Both cases found their 
particular facts sufficient to support a bad check conviction 
under a single contemporaneous transaction standard. See also 
Gillev v. State, 356 S.E.2d 655, 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (finding 
contemporaneous transaction where work completed on Friday and 
check delivered the following Monday). 
20030189-CA 8 
3. The Record as a Whole Demonstrates Facts Placing Robison's 
Actions Squarely Within the Purview of the Bad Check Statute 
As stated above, I would hold that Robison's plea has 
adequate factual support solely from the facts admitted at the 
plea hearing. However, given the majority's decision to examine 
Robison's claims under the "great and manifest injustice" 
standard, it is appropriate to examine the remainder of the 
record to fill in the details of the transaction underlying 
Robison's plea. Those details reveal a very different version of 
events than those argued by Robison on appeal. And, unlike this 
court, the trial court was well aware of the complete context of 
Robison's actions from various pretrial pleadings and the in-
court testimony of the victim at a prior motion hearing.5 
Robison and his victim had never met prior to the truck 
transaction, and there were no prior vehicle transactions between 
the two. Robison first contacted the victim by phone6 around the 
end of July 2001 to request the victim's assistance in selling a 
separate vehicle. In mid-August, Robison again spoke with the 
victim seeking to locate a suitable truck for a potential buyer. 
The victim located the truck through his wholesaler network and 
ordered it for Robison. 
Robison took physical possession of the truck on approval 
for his customer on September 1, 2 0 01. That same day, Robison 
informed the victim that his customer was interested in buying 
the truck, and the victim agreed to send Robison the title and 
paperwork7 once Robison provided a check. On September 11, the 
victim contacted Robison about payment, and Robision agreed to 
send the victim a check, which he did. The victim only sent, 
i.e., was "induced to give," Robison title to the truck after 
5. The contextual facts recited in this section of the opinion 
are taken from pleadings and exhibits filed in this action, 
seeking to determine proper possession of the truck as between 
competing third party claimants.' kt the hearing on this dispute, 
the victim in this matter gave extensive testimony about the 
facts, circumstances, and timingXofc the truck transaction. 
6. The victim testified that he spoke with Robison four or five 
times on the phone prior to September 1, 2001. 
7. Exhibits to prior pleadings demonstrate that title to the 
truck was not even issued to the victim, and thus could not have 
been transferred to Robison, until September 5, 2001. Similarly, 
the sales contract contemplated a cash sale of the truck to 
Robison on September 11 for $40,812. 
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Robison issued a bad check in payment. Howells, 565 P.2d at 
1149. 
These supporting facts strongly suggest that Robison's 
issuance of a bad check was not merely substantially but actually 
in exchange for title to, rather than mere physical possession 
of, the truck. If Robison believed that these or other facts 
conflicted with the legal elements of a bad check charge, he 
should have expressly raised the issue at the trial court level. 
Had he done so, the facts could have been sifted and justice 
assured. Doing this type of analysis at the appellate level, 
without the benefit of trial court 'fact sifting,' is 
problematic. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, even assuming that the relevant time 
period is the ten-day delay between Robison's initial physical 
receipt of the truck and his issuance of a bad check, I would 
affirm the trial court. Under my reading of Utah law, the court 
was justified in accepting Robison's plea solely based on his 
admissions that he had issued a check that had not been honored, 
that the check was issued in a transaction involving the recent 
receipt of a truck, and that the truck had a value in excess of 
$5,000. The record further indicates that Robison issued the 
check prior to and in exchange for the title and other paperwork 
that established legal transfer of ownership of the truck to 
Robison. 
I see no injustice, great or otherwise, in holding Robison 
to his guilty plea and would accordingly affirm the trial court's 
denial of Robison's motion to withdraw. 
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